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Abstract
Partially rooted in British colonial ethnology and administration, the ethnic cate-
gories of the 2014Myanmar census have attracted controversy, particularly from repre-
sentatives of non-Burman political organizations. The categories themselves, as well
as the bureaucratic exercise of the census, have a complex genealogy which offers
considerable insight into understanding the contemporary situation. Drawing from
Hirschman’s theory that the study of measurements of ethnicity is a unique resource
for understanding the meaning of ethnicity in a society, this article discusses the con-
troversy surrounding the 2014 census, and how some census-related issues have been
crucially framed by bureaucratic structures that came before.
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Sunday 30 March 2014 saw the commencement of Myanmar’s1 first national
census in over 30 years. The Ministry of Immigration and Population, together
with teams of international analysts from the United Nations Population Fund
(unfpa) and approximately us$75million in international grants, spent a year
and a half organizing for the massive data-gathering operation. Completion of
1 Following a coup in 1988, the military government changed the name of the country from
Burma to Myanmar. Numerous activist groups and some governments, including that of the
United States, refused to adopt the name change. I use the present name in discussions of the
regime post-1988, and Burma when discussing the regime before then. This is not intended
to reflect any political position.
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the survey was scheduled for 10 April 2014. One month prior to the dispatch
of over 80,000 enumerators throughout the country, the well-known comedian
and former political prisonerUZaganar, (appointed ‘census ambassador’)went
on a national tour in a so-called census bus, to raise awareness and support
for the extensive project. As part of the campaign, local participants were
encouraged to recite the census slogan out loud for as long as possible, in the
hope of winning a census T-shirt or baseball cap. The slogan is: ‘Nation-wide
census—Let’s all participate’ (ျပည္သူအားလုုံးပါ၀င္လုုိ.သန္းေခါင္စာရင္း ေကာက္စိုု).
Rooted in imperialism, the institution of the modern census profoundly
shaped how colonizers imagined their respective dominions (Anderson 1991:
164). Colonial authorities used these data as a way of knowing their sovereign
empires. Similarly, the exercise of democratic government is inextricably
bound to the use of such calculated power (Rose 1991:673), as the kinds of
information sought, and the ways in which data are collected and interpreted,
will frame the ways in which legal authority is exercised over populations.
According to unfpa Myanmar, ‘without up-to-date data, it has been difficult
for planners and policymakers to formulate, implement, monitor and evaluate
development programs’ (unfpa 2013b).
Much bureaucratic classification follows precedence (Hirschman 1987:555)
with the objective of making inter-census comparisons (Christopher 2009:101),
and in that sense each new subsystem will draw upon the inertia of those that
came before (Bowker and Star 1999:33). In the case of Myanmar’s census, the
fact that the most recent survey was carried out over three decades ago means
that nearly all the civil servants involved in the previous operation are either
retired or dead, thus precluding any significant degree of direct institutional
memory or experience. On the other hand, for those involved, as well as for
politically invested groups and the general public, the lack of inertia opens
greater opportunity to question the current operation, its raison d’être, and the
significant regime change(s) in the interim.
In the process of the 2014 enumeration, the government’s continued use of
ethnic categories has attracted a great deal of controversy. The census requires
respondents to return their luumyo, or race/ethnicity, and the coding process
makes use of a much-criticized scheme consisting of eight national races and
135 eligible sub-groups. These categories have a complex political and semantic
history inMyanmar, due to theways inwhichethnographic and linguistic diver-
sity have been channelled into categorical frameworks by both colonial and
post-colonial regimes. These categories have also acquired different kinds of
meaning and resonance as a result of ongoing political-resistance movements.
Because census categories constitute a method through which the state
seeks to tabulate and therefore ‘know’ the diversity of a population, studying
ethnicity, belonging, and the national census in burma/myanmar 3
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the history of the census as a bureaucratic instrument offers a unique resource
to understand the meaning of ethnicity in relation to the state (Hirschman
1987:557). The state of Burma/Myanmar has a decades-long history of inter-
nal conflict, with numerous armed groups organized along ethnic lines. Many
studies of the ongoing ethnic conflict, however, fail to question the ontologies
of ethnicity in the area, or how the machinations of state bureaucracies have
sought to name, measure, and understand them. Thus, to examine the con-
temporary controversies ignited by the census in Myanmar, it is also useful to
identify and describe the kinds of classification that came before, and in so
doing illuminate the networks of power in which they are embedded (Bowker
and Star 1999:42).
This article will discuss the historical role of the Burma/Myanmar census
enumeration as part of a process for organizing—and creating—ideas about
ethnicity, citizenship, and belonging. It will also reveal some of the difficul-
ties that enumerators faced in making use of categories that did not neatly fit
the ethnographic realities they sought to describe and quantify. By highlight-
ing the relationship between political regimes and how they understand their
sovereignties through census data, as well as the problems encountered in the
data-gathering process, this article will also show how some of these very prob-
lems resonate with the contemporary criticism of the 2014 census project. To
that end, this article is organized in four sections: First, it will present a his-
torical overview of the British colonial censuses and discuss some of the issues
that confronted colonial enumerators as they tried to categorize and under-
stand language and race in Burma; second, it provides a brief discussion of the
ethno-national character of the post-colonial regime and of how regime and
bureaucratic changes framed the 1973 and 1983 censuses; third, it will analyse
the implementation of the 2014 census, paying special attention to the criticism
it has attracted; lastly, it will show how these contemporary census debates
serve to demonstrate the fractal nature of the political exercise in general, and,
in unfortunate irony, that thosemost critical of the ethnic categories of the cen-
sus still depend on the categories for their political survival.
Counting on the Census
The main objective of the earliest censuses in ancient Greece was to assess
military capability, and later states made use of them for purposes of taxa-
tion and resource allocation (Missiakoulis 2010:413). At themost basic level, the
act of counting people intrinsically requires eligibility of those people in a cer-
tain class or group, but it also ‘involves reciprocal performances in which the
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counted objects are complicit in, or resistive to, the social production of counts’
(Martin and Lynch 2009:243). These acts, in their construction and manipu-
lation, serve as a method for measuring phenomena which otherwise might
not be directly measurable (Cobb and Rixford 1998:1). Census data have been
used to create social statistics, which have also been referred to as indicators.
Although they were developed as instruments of government rule, in recent
decades indicators have also beenusedby international groups concernedwith
measuring and comparing international aid, non-governmental organizations,
and human-rights issues across national boundaries (Merry 2011:s83), a point
that resonates particularly with the development goals as discussed by unfpa.
The British colonial censuses introduced in India in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries effectively re-arranged local difference into figures that
were legible to the colonial empire, providing an ‘essential abstraction from
social reality’ (Kumar 2006:377), and later serving to frame ethnic problems and
issues (Cohn 1996; Dirks 2001). Censuses and population statistics, as govern-
ing tools, are used to define minority populations, and, reflexively, majorities
(Appadurai 2005:41), although the process is not necessarily unidirectional.
Anti-colonial nationalist movements have made use of colonial map and cen-
sus data to define national territory and population as a basis for their indepen-
dence (Anderson 1991).
Martin and Lynch (2009) coin the term ‘numero-politics’ as a moniker to
describe the disputes regarding counts, estimates, and measures. Numero-
political disputes can result in modifications of census categories and proce-
dures. For example, changes in questions regarding race in the United States
census have been informed by scholarly conceptualizations shifting from bio-
logical determinism to socially constructed models, as well as the efforts of
political interest groups (Terry and Fond 2013:525). Great Britain, for example,
started to collect information on ethnic groups in the 1991 census (Aspinall
2000:110), and community-based organizations in Ireland were able to gain
recognition and legitimacy through the categorization of Travellers within the
scheme of ethnicity (King-O’Riain 2007:518).
With the state creating a regime of classification, indigeneity also becomes
an entity which is both bureaucratically and socially constructed, and several
groups within a nation-state may lay claim to this status (Nah 2006:285). The
use of categories involving race/ethnicity in a modern census is now interna-
tionally common: a study of 138 national-census questionnaires found that 87
of them (or 63%) used some kind of ethnic classification (Morning 2006:4).
Therefore, the examination of the history of those categories in each of those
nations can reveal key informationnot only about howabureaucracy canmake
sense of, and quantify, the diversity of its subjects, but also how it responds
ethnicity, belonging, and the national census in burma/myanmar 5
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to international ideas about modernity and human development. Finally, the
study of census genealogies can give some idea (albeit incomplete and not
always deterministic) as to how political organizations and social movements
might frame their contestations of that bureaucratic process.
The Colonial Census Takes Form(s)
This 2014 exercisewill beMyanmar’s twelfthWestern-style census. Some schol-
ars of the ongoing ethnic conflict in the country have evenargued that therehas
not been an ‘accurate’ census since the British colonial2 census of 1931 (Smith
1994:17; South 2011:10). Whereas the British beganmapping the territory follow-
ing the end of the first Anglo-Burmese war in 1826, the first3 colonial census
was carried out in 1872, albeit of a significantly smaller territory than what the
country is now (Bennison 1933:vii). It was not until 1891 that Upper Burma was
enumerated, as those territories were annexed five years prior (India Census
Commissioner 1904:58). From 1881, the colonial census repeated once every
decade, and censuses from 1901 onwards were more uniform and consistent in
their coverage (Maung 1997:9). The final colonial census was in 1941, but results
were never completed; during the British evacuation of Burma in 1942, the
1941 census officer fled, leaving behind all of the data save two pages (Andrus
1947:24).
During the colonial years, the over-stretched British administration’s goal
was to collect all their data synchronously, and thus create a freeze-frame
impression of the population. Generally, enumeration would take place over
one week. Where officials were sparse, or terrain particularly difficult, the enu-
merators would make their best estimation (Richell 2006:26), and compilers
did make it clear which parts of the country were surveyed ‘synchronously’,
‘non-synchronously’, and ‘estimated’ (Bennison 1933:vii; Lowis 1902:3).
Racial classification and exclusion constituted a major trope within the
colonial state’s empirical understanding of its subjects (Lee 2009:38) and this
bureaucratic vision and practice would create very real consequences. Using
contemporary ideas of ethnological and geographical mapping, the British
2 Burmawas a colony of the British Empire from 1826 to 1948, but the territorywas incorporated
into the Empire in increments, following three Anglo-Burmese wars: 1824–26, 1852, and 1885.
3 From the Inwa Period (late fourteenth century) onwards, Burmese courts maintained close
written connections with their civil servants and carried out extensive census and tax reports
regarding armies, religious services, headmen succession, and legal decisions (Lieberman
2003:190).
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bureaucratically solidified the idea of an intrinsic, mappable connection be-
tween a ‘people’ and a ‘territory’. They established ‘Burma Proper/Ministerial
Burma’ as the lowlands which were annexed as part of British India, and the
‘Frontier/Scheduled Areas’, where KachinDuwas and Shan Saophas were given
semi-autonomous authority over their subjects. As the historian Thant Myint-
Uwrites, ‘the territorial limits of the country, the notion of who is Burmese and
who is not, key social and political structures, all find their origins in this period
surrounding the fall ofMandalay’ (ThantMyint-U 2001:10). Administrative divi-
sions thus exacerbated the problem of ethnic definitions (Callahan 1996:71).
When they carried out the census, the British-trained enumerators required
that respondents give single, discrete, unqualified answers for their race, and
these would be fit into a prescribed categorical scheme (Charney 2009:9). The
Burmese term for race/ethnicity used in the census is luumyo, literally, ‘type
of person’. Amyo, type, or sort, in reference to people is often translated as
‘race’, though the understanding of it being biologically immutable (ascribed),
or socially constructed (achieved), is ambiguous, and thus situational. The con-
nection of one’s amyo to one’s language is a concept brought by colonial ideas
of race and ethnicity. Prior to colonialism, in the Dhammasat legal texts, amyo
implied class distinction (Ikeya 2011:25). In the pre-British Restored Toungoo
and Konboung eras, particularly after 1630, Burmese regimes made use of cen-
suses for purposes of taxation as well as for military recruitment (Lieberman
1991:21). They would not necessarily be concerned with race or language as
a phenomenon which required counting or mapping; indeed, at the onset of
colonialism the locals subscribed to a very different concept of ethnicity than
the colonialists (Gravers 2007:13; Lee 2009:37). Their situation offers further evi-
dence to the position that the very methods of counting themselves constitute
social problems (Martin and Lynch 2009:244).
Regardless, it was census enumerators who had to solicit this information
from respondents. The problems and confusing situations they encountered,
given the tremendous ethnographic, cultural, and linguistic diversity of the
terrain, particularly in Upper Burma, are veritably limitless. Some of these
problems were discussed in the colonial census report volumes.
The system of caste, or a hierarchical social system based on occupation,
prestige, and ideas about pollution, had been considered a master trope in the
framing of the imperial census (Kumar 2006:387), and one which colonial offi-
cers had grown accustomed to in British India. Census officials even noted that
caste could be tested by ‘actual existing facts and beliefs to a far greater extent
than is possible with respect to race’ (Webb 1912:250). However, the categories
of caste simply did not gain traction for census officials working in Burma; thus
they struggled to find another way to approach human difference and quantify
ethnicity, belonging, and the national census in burma/myanmar 7
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race4 in Burma. According to C.C. Lowis (1902), the Burman is ‘so absolutely
enamored of freedom that he cannot abide the bonds that caste demands’
(Lowis 1902:107). Without the category of caste, and where religion ‘indicates
but little’, colonial surveyors concluded that language would therefore be the
most ‘obvious and surest criterion of difference’ (Lowis 1902:112):
If the speech of a particular community cannot be assigned to a particu-
lar group, that community is, ipso facto, isolated, whatever similarity its
customs, dress and physical traits may have with the customs, dress and
physical traits of any other community, neighbouring or otherwise.
Although there was such demonstrated reliance on language being the best
indication of difference, the data did not always readily make sense. H.L. Eales
noted that the number of Karen people increased an astounding 56%between
1872 and 1881 (Richell 2006:28), though later C. Morgan Webb made the obser-
vation that missionary influence allowed Sgaw and Pwo Karen languages to
hold their own, and avoid any ‘tendency whatever to succumb to the Burmese
influence that surrounds them’ (Webb 1912:206). That still does not explain
a 56% population rise in less than a decade, though. Where some popula-
tions grew by unbelievable proportions, others, logically, shrank. The Tavoyans
(those of modern-day Dawei) in 1901 had a total population of five, but accord-
ing to the census report, the fault was theirs for returning their language as
Burmese, rather than Dawei (Lowis 1902:76). It was later noted that the Shan
peoples were so ‘peculiarly distributed’ that logical divisions were impossible
(Webb 1912:237). Finally, the Turungs offered an even more perplexing case:
they were from Assam, but had been captured by Singphos for five years dur-
ing a journey through what is now Kachin State. During those five years, they
claimed to have learned Singpho, but reported to enumerators that they did
not speak Turung anymore (Lowis 1902:78).
Enumerators were sensitive to the fact that they would need to report immi-
grant populations, given the scale of immigration to the country—Rangoon
being theworld’s number oneport of entry for immigrants (Charney 2009:19)—
and quantifying this was no small task. When enumerators met with popula-
tions who spoke languages far removed from their own, for many cases they
would report themas kala saga (foreign language, though the term kala is often
4 The nine ‘race’ categories used by the British census-takers were: 1. Burmese; 2. Other indige-
nous race; 3. Chinese; 4. Indians born in Burma; 5. Indians born outside Burma; 6. Indo-
Burman race; 7. Europeans and allied races; 8. Anglo-Indians; 9. Other race.
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applied pejoratively to denote Indians). Sometimes they would attempt to be
more precise, but this would engender other problems. C.C. Lowis noticed that
‘Bingala/Bengalawas a term applied indiscriminately to the speech of persons
from every portion of the empire’ (Lowis 1902:92). This is prescient, consid-
ering the seriousness of the situation today, and the violent exclusion of the
Rohingyas, who some insist are ‘really’ Bengali.5
Because of noted discrepancies, the officials for the 1931 census changed the
way in which enumerators would solicit information regarding language. They
were required to ask respondents for ‘mother tongue as spoken from the cradle’,
for column 14 of the form, and for ‘subsidiary language […] [or] any other
language commonly used by the speaker’6 to bewritten in column 15 (Bennison
1933:173). From 1921 to 1931, theMon-speakingpopulation increased61%,which
was attributed to ‘the fact that Burmese was returned at the 1921 census by
many Mons as the language used in the home, whereas in the 1931 census
they probably returned Mon as their mother tongue’ (Bennison 1933:174). The
colonial authorities have commented on the ‘non-coincidence of census and
linguistic boundaries’ (Webb 1912:212) as well as the ‘extreme instability of
language and racial distinctions’ in the country (Bennison 1933:174). Another
noted that ‘there is no insuperable boundary between themembers of separate
races, and still less between the members of separate tribes’ (Webb 1912:250).
In a special appendix to the 1931 Census, Captain J.H. Green writes:
Some of the races or tribes in Burma change their language almost as
often as they change their clothes. Languages are changedby conquest, by
absorption, by isolation and by a general tendency to adopt the language
of a neighbour who is considered to belong to a more powerful, more
numerous, or more advanced race or tribe.
green 1933:245
5 Rohingya Muslims’ estimated population in Myanmar is approximately 800,000 (Kipgen
2014:236). They have also been at the receiving end of communal violence, and of claims
that they are illegal Bengali immigrants. Following two outbreaks of violence in 2012, where
thousands of homes were burnt and over a hundred thousand people were displaced to
brutally inadequate shelters, the un described the Rohingyas as ‘the world’s most perse-
cuted minority’. See Peter Popham, ‘No end in sight to the sufferings of “the world’s most
persecuted minority”—Burma’s Rohingya Muslims’, The Independent, 8-10-2012. http://www
.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/no-end-in-sight-to-the-sufferings-of-the-worlds-most
-persecuted-minority-burmas-rohingya-muslims-8202784.html (accessed 7-7-2014).
6 Even though, as Leach noted, ‘unity of speech’ does not denote ‘any deep subjective feeling
of social solidarity’ (Leach 2004:48).
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This cues the well-known work of anthropologist Edmund Leach, who ob-
served that more prosperous groups in the uplands demonstrated a tendency
to adopt a Shan or Burmese style of living, and convert to Buddhism. As he
famously noted, ‘any individual can start as a member of one category and end
up in another’ (Leach 1960:62). But towhat extent have these categories carried
a legacy, both legal and social, beyond the colonial period?
Independent Enumeration: The Post-Colonial Years
Although many discussions of the decades-long internal conflict will chalk
these problems up to British colonial ‘divide and rule’ practices, it is essen-
tial to take into consideration the ways in which ideas about ethnicity, nation,
and political power changed following independence. On the brink of inde-
pendence, British authorities demanded that Burmese politicians demonstrate
cooperation with the Frontier Areas before granting full autonomy to the for-
mer colony. As such, an accordwas hastily put together and signed at the south-
ern Shan State town of Panglong, and later called the Panglong Agreement.
In this agreement, politicians representing the former Frontier Area states did
agree for their constituencies to join the Union of Burma on a conditional basis
for ten years, whereupon they would have the option to secede (and it was part
of the 1948Constitution that the Shan andKarenni states had this right) if itwas
the state majority’s elected will to do so. One of the oft-repeated phrases used
to characterize the pluralist vision of the Union of Burma was General Aung
San’s famous, Bama ta kyat, Shan ta kyat, or ‘if Burma receives one kyat, Shan
will receive one kyat’.
In its third article, The Union Citizenship Act of 1948 was explicit regarding
which groups would be full citizens:
For the purposes of section 11 of the Constitution the expression ‘any
of the indigenous races of Burma’ shall mean the Arakanese, Burmese,
Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah, Mon or Shan race and such racial group as
has settled in any of the territories included within the Union as their
permanent home from a period anterior to 1823 a.d. (1185 b.e.).
Therefore, for the newly independent government, to be indigenous meant to
exist in the territory demarcated as the Union of Burma before the first Anglo-
BurmeseWar. It was not completely exclusive, though: Section 11, part 2, would
allow anyone whose parents and grandparents had lived on the territories to
be granted citizenship as well.
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The map for the newly independent Union of Burma was drafted such that
there would be seven predominantly Burman taing (divisions), in the central
lowlands and upper Dry Zone, and seven pyinay (states), largely populated by
non-Burmans and named according to the presumed majority group in each
state (Map 1). Such a division, with the seven Burman taing divisions and the
seven non-Burman pyinay states, further reinforced the idea of official races,
and the basis for bureaucratic representation. The 1948 Constitution desig-
nated that the Chamber of Nationalities, totalling 125 seats, would be com-
prised by 25 Shan, 12 Kachin, 8 Chin, 3 Karenni, 24 Karen, and 53 Burman seats
(Constituent Assembly of Burma 1948:67). Even though the major political
players were Burman, it is worth noting that there was not any ‘special indige-
nous’ status ascribed to one group, unlike the British privileging of Malays over
orang asli in post-colonial Malaysia (Nah 2006:285). This is not to say, however,
that Burmans necessarily thought of their race as equal in status to that of their
non-Burman counterparts; part of the rhetoric which supports Burman ethnic
chauvinism is the idea that Burmans led the anti-colonial struggle, and that
they are the only ‘major group whose total population resides within the ter-
ritorial bounds of the state’ (Steinberg 2001:190). By this standard, while other
groups might be indigenous, only the Burmans are exclusively indigenous.
Even so, the vision for a newly independent Burma crucially depended on
an image that included these eight official races, and this independent nation
posited its indigeneity in opposition to foreign control, and more specifically,
against non-indigenous capitalists such as the Chinese, Indians, and Euro-
peans; similar to that of the Dobama Asi-ayone, this ideology was formed in
contrast to a colonizing other.
Following independence, the Union of Burma government did not conduct
a census for two and a half decades.7 The ongoing insurgencies, and especially
the Kuomintang incursion, facilitated the growth of the army, and eventually
led to Ne Win’s 1962 military coup, the establishment of the Revolutionary
Council government and the BurmeseWay to Socialism. Itwas frequently artic-
ulated that the socialist economic system would be the basis for ethnic unity,
and that building such a society would be the work of all people of Myanmar,
not just the Burman majority (ေမာင္ခ်စ္လႈိင္ 1969:32). Through the 1963 estab-
lishment of the Enterprises Nationalization Law, then the Socialist Economy
Protection Law, the Burmese government took commerce out of the hands of
private business owners, especially non-Burmese.8 The impetus for this nation-
7 Not including the incomplete census of 1953–55 (Spoorenberg 2013:310).
8 At the time, Indians controlled 60% of the trade and commerce in the country (Maung
Maung Gyi 1981:5).
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alization was principally to oust foreign dominance and eliminate farmer ten-
ancy (Steinberg 2001:140; ဦးျမသိန္း 2012:47). However, the Burmese government
gradually recognized the shortcomings of its isolationist economic policies,
and in the 1970s began a series of state development plans and administrative
reforms. In July 1971, the Party Central Committee of the Revolutionary Council
moved to draft a state constitution for the establishment of a socialist demo-
cratic state (Moscotti 1977:6). At the same time, the government began to seek
foreign aid.
International donor organizations, such as the World Bank, the United Na-
tions and the AsianDevelopment Bank, as well as a Japanese foreign assistance
programme, responded enthusiastically to what they saw as the biggest liberal-
izationmoveby theBurmese government inover adecade (Steinberg 2001:255).
unfpa agreed to support a Population and Housing Census (unfpa 2013a),
which took place in April 1973, and the population data enumerated by the
census were used to compile constituency electoral rolls for People’s Councils
(Moscotti 1977:143). The government presented the census as being important
for the development of the economy, the social welfare of the people, and for
making new laws (ျပန္ၾကားေရးႏွင့္အသံလႊင့္ဦးစီးဌာန 1973:206).
During the colonial period, the British had made use of substantial num-
bers of civil servants trained in India; in fact, much of the mid-level colonial
administration in Burma was Indian, a significant portion of whom settled
in Burma after World War ii. But with the increasing ethno-nationalism and
eventual expulsion of foreigners in the 1960s, the Burmese bureaucracy found
itself lacking experienced professional administrators to carry out such a large-
scale bureaucratic endeavour as the census (Maung 1986:1). In spite of this,
with unfpa support, they carried out the 1973 census, though they did not
include significant swaths of territory thatwere controlled by separatist armies.
For the enumeration process, the categories of race/ethnicity were condensed
as 1. indigenous races (the eight major races); 2. non-indigenous or foreign
races; and 3. mixed Burmese and foreign. Unsurprisingly, the returns suggested
a largely indigenous population, mostly chalked up to the mass emigration
of foreigners in the prior decade (Maung 1981:17). Furthermore, it is probable
that individuals of mixed parentage would be inclined to self-report as one of
the indigenous races, given the anti-foreign political climate at the time. The
new constitution, drafted in 1974, institutionalized the Burmese Socialist Pro-
grammeParty9 (bspp) as the sole leader of the country, similar to contemporary
9 In Burmese: ျမန္မာ့ဆိုုရွယ္လစ္လမ္းစဥ္ပါတီ
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figure 2 A plaque commemorating the 1973 census
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figure 3 A photograph of census enumerators at work (ျပန္ၾကားေရးႏွင့္အသံလႊင့့္္ဦးစီးဌာန 1973:206).
one-party states in Eastern Europe and China (Steinberg 1987:400). This sys-
tem also served as a mechanism for moving military officers into bureau-
cratic positions, thus parliament consisted largely of retired generals (Nakan-
ishi 2013:167).
The above-mentioned regime changes, together with the census, sufficed to
give donor organizations the green light to provide development assistance to
Burma, and the 1970s saw a tremendous expansion in aid money, especially
compared with the isolated 1960s. For example, the World Bank allocated 30
ida credits, worth us$804 million, and Japanese support increased to us$178
million by the end of the decade (Steinberg 2001:255). All of this development
support came only after a census, significant bureaucratic restructuring, and
suggestions of return to civilian rule on the part of the Burmese government.
It is particularly illuminating to consider these issues in light of the debates
regarding the consequences of the 2014 census, as will be illustrated later in
this article.
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Burmese Socialist Programme Party rule continued, and in 1982, just before
the next scheduled census, they revised the 1948 Citizenship Law, and made
it more stringent regarding who would be genuine citizens of the country.
They used ideas of jus sanguinis, as detailed in the first part of the former
citizenship law: only those belonging to the eight national races would qualify
for citizenship, and those ethnic groups who had settled within the state prior
to 1823 would be allowed Burmese citizenship (1982 Pyithu Hluttaw LawNo. 4);
they deleted the second part of the citizenship law whereby people whose
grandparents had settled in the territory could register as full citizens.
The 1983 census, again supported by unfpa (unfpa 2013a) is widely criti-
cized for its lack of independent supervision, and the fact that there were sub-
stantial populations in conflict areaswhichdidnot enter the survey.10Although
the 1983 census, like its 1973 counterpart, failed to define the term ‘race’ for
its enumerators, specifying it merely as the ‘ethnic origin of the person being
enumerated’ (Maung 1997:4), the 1983 exercise did introduce a new scheme
for categorizing ethnicity: a list of 135 sub-categories within the eight national
races. How the government arrived at the number 135 is a bit of a mystery.11
One argument suggests that they adopted the number from the 1931 British
Census, which lists 135 languages. Informants in Myanmar have suggested that
the number came from Senior General Saw Maung, founder of the State Law
and Order Restoration Council (slorc). When he was once questioned as to
why the military was having difficulty with ‘ethnic’ insurgencies, he responded
that the problem was partly due to the large number of ethnic groups: 135. Fol-
lowing this proclamation, the government institutionalized the number 135 as
an expansion of the eight official races. Another, even more arbitrary, sugges-
tion is that becauseGeneral NeWin’s favourite number is nine, the government
devised 135 sub-categories, as one plus three plus five is nine.
Scrutinizing the list, one can find numerous inconsistencies. For exam-
ple, some groups are listed according to exogamous names, whereas others
are listed by endogamous names. Many are listed according to the name of
their language, while others are named based on their location or principal
town. One group, the Mro/Wakim, is listed under both Chin and Rakhine. The
preponderance of group names, arguably, has unnecessarily subdivided some
races. For example, Kachin political leaders have argued that six of the named
10 Tun Tun Thein, ‘Census begins in Burma’s Kachin state’, Democratic Voice of Burma,
6-3-2014. http://www.dvb.no/uncategorized/census-begins-in-burmas-kachin-state
-myanmar/38125 (accessed 7-3-2014).
11 To be fair, the bspp government had previously acknowledged 144 groups in the country,
but they were not micro-managed in the form of government id cards.
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twelve sub-groups are but clans within other groups; therefore, there are six
Kachin groups, not twelve. The same case has been made for the Karen/Kayin
race, with the government scheme placing the number of sub-groups as nine,
but Karen leaders saying that there are five.Within the total Chin population of
an estimated one million people, the government list specifies 53 sub-groups,
but these listed groups are, in some cases, merely alternative spellings of the
samename, thenameof a variant dialect of one language, or again, clanswithin
another sub-group.12
In addition to recognized groups finding themselves incorrectly identified or
subdivided, the list of 135 excludes a number of groups. A few of the groups not
included in the list are: Panthay Chinese Muslims, Overseas Chinese (speakers
of Hokkien and Cantonese), Anglo-Burmese (Eurasians of mixed Burmese and
European background), Burmese Indians, Gurkha, Pakistanis, and Rohingyas.
The issue of the exclusion of the Rohingyas has become hotly contested in
recent years; how this affects census enumerationwill be discussed later in this
article.
Following the 1988 protests and the military overthrow of the bspp regime,
the new ruling regime effected a controversial name-change. Part of the justifi-
cation for changing the country’s name from Burma to Myanmar was the idea
that the new name would be more inclusive of all of the people in the coun-
try, not specifically the Burman majority, an idea which had been articulated
decades ago (ေမာင္ခ်စ္လႈိင္ 1969:31). It would result in a cognitive separation of
ethnic identity and the name of the state, in other words, a Bamar or a Shan
could be a full citizen of Myanmar Naingan (Taylor 2008:221). This is debat-
able, however, as both names are derived from the same word (Burma simply
being the colloquial versionofMyanmar) andhave the samemeaning, and thus
the name change would be unlikely to create a more inclusive nation (Lintner
2003:174).
The State Law and Order Restoration Council regime, specifically Khin Ny-
unt, was able to convince a number of ethnic insurgent groups to consent
to ceasefire agreements, which resulted in several of them gaining significant
legitimate economic autonomy and sovereignty. However, the slorc regime
(with its more sonorous endonym, State Peace and Development Council, or
12 Shibani Mahtani, ‘Myanmar census plan draws fire: Results could spur Buddhist extrem-
ists to violence, report says’,TheWall Street Journal, 13-2-2014. http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB10001424052702304703804579380050319463342 (accessed 10-3-2014); ‘Explosion
heats up census’, Burma News International, 1-4-2014. http://bnionline.net/index.php/
news/khonumthung/16894-explosion-heats-up-census.html (accessed 2-4-2014).
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spdc) did not carry out a census in 1993, in spite of plans to continue the decen-
nial census (Maung 1997:9). It was only following the new 2008 Constitution
and the 2010 reforms that the need for a new census was brought to the table.
The NewMyanmar and the 2014 Census
The United Nations Population Fund, in consultation with an international
technical advisory group and the Myanmar Ministry of Immigration and Pop-
ulation, spent 18 months developing the format and implementation plan for
the 2014 census.13 The official enumeration period was scheduled to take place
from 30 March to 10 April 2014, and the enumeration form itself consisted of
41 questions. According to preliminary tests, the form required about 25 min-
utes for each person to complete with the assistance of a trained enumerator.
Some reports suggest that the individual enumeration process actually took
around 45 minutes.14 Agreements with the ministry and unfpa stipulate that
enumerators are required to write down exactly what their respondents say.
Intentionally dishonest reporting attracts a 50,000 Kyat fine, and/or a prison
sentence of onemonth. The survey calls for participants to identify themselves
with one major race (one of the eight national races) as well as one sub-group
(of the official 135 ethnic groups), though it does have an ‘other’ option (code
number 914), where the respondent can write in the name of her or his eth-
nic group. In an informational pamphlet issued by the government about the
upcoming census, the reason stated for collecting information on ethnicity is
explained as follows:
Ethnicity of an individual can define culture and behavior of a person and
can play differing roles in how some people are shaped and influenced in
society. Tobeable tounderstandwhy in someareas thedemographic indi-
cators are higher or lower than another area, one has to understand the
norms of the people based on ethnicity. Information on ethnicity can also
be used in research to further understand how different groups of people
are evolving, especially where marriages, migration, education, work and
other factors bring different ethnicities into close proximity andmay lead
13 Mahtani, ‘Myanmar census plan draws fire’.
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to changingperceptions and self-identifications, understandings andnew
definitions of groupings.
unfpa 2013b
The brochure states why ethnicity is important to the census project, but fails
to define what exactly ethnicity is, nor does it provide any specific instruction
on how to differentiate between ethnicities—though the last sentence seems
to suggest that there is potential flexibility in the category due to political and
socio-economic circumstances.
In February 2014, the director-general of the Ministry of Immigration and
Population, UMyint Khaing, claimed that the project had the agreement of all
the national races.15 Forminority groups, passing a certainminimum represen-
tation, as evidenced by the new census, wouldmeanministerial representation
in local governments.16 However, those places would need to be surveyed first.
Mountainous geography and poor roads, coupled with seasonal rains, make
places in Kachin State and Shan State (the northern and eastern areas) diffi-
cult to access and survey efficiently. Some groups petitioned the government
to commence the census project in those areas one month earlier (လူမြန္ 2014),
a request which does have precedence in the 1931 colonial census: the British
gave enumerators three months in advance to survey ‘sparsely populated, dif-
ficult areas’ as part of the ‘non-synchronous’ sections of the census (Bennison
1933:vii). This request was not granted for the 2014 census, as unfpa standards
for a modern census require a narrow window for enumeration.
The other geographic issue for enumeration is the fact that areas of the Shan
and the Kachin states remain controlled by armed separatist groups. U Aung
Myint, a spokesperson for theWaNationalUnity Party, said in an interview that
an accurate census ofWa areas would help to build peace and economic devel-
opment, ultimately contributing to a higher standard of living for people in the
areas (ခ်ိဳဇင္မာ၀င့္၊ ေမစုုၾကည္ 2014). TheWa areas of Shan State were part of the ter-
ritories not included in the 1983 census, for reasons of ‘security restrictions’, and
it had been estimated that those areas contain a population of 1.2 million peo-
ple (Spoorenberg 2013:310). Another article suggested thoseWa areas are home
to 450,000 people of 17 or 18 nationalities (ခ်ိဳဇင္မာ၀င့္၊ ေမစုုၾကည္ 2014). Approxi-
mately 80,000 residents of Kachin State were estimated to have been excluded
15 Nirmal Ghosh, ‘Myanmar census risks stirring ethnic tensions: Zooming in on race and
religion can aggravate ongoing sectarian violence’, The Straits Times, 20-2-2014.
16 Samantha Michaels and Yen Snaing, ‘Burma urged to drop census questions on ethnicity,
religion’, The Irrawaddy, 13-2-2014. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/burma-urged-drop
-census-questions-ethnicity-religion.html (accessed 10-3-2014).
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from the 2014 census because those areas are controlled by the Kachin Inde-
pendence Organization (Yen Snaing 2014).17
Most of the controversywith the 2014 enumerationprocess, though, is direct-
ed at the interpretation and application of the scheme delineating 135 ethnic
sub-groups. It was noted that people in Dawei have tended to identify with the
‘Tavoyan’ category (number 505),whereas the largepopulation fromDawei that
is now in Yangon has chosen ‘Bamar’.18 To drum up Mon political numbers, an
mp from Chaung Sone Township in Mon State campaigned to encourage more
people to self-identify as Mon (number 601), regardless of whether they could
speak or read the Mon language, if they believed they were descended from
Mon people.19 Do recall that Mon populations expanded greatly between 1921
and 1931, largely due to the rephrasingof the colonial census (as detailed above).
According to mp Aung Naing Oo, many ethnic Mon have already been
classified as Bamar, as noted on their national identity cards or household
registration cards. For the census, some of these people fear that if they were to
try to respond as ‘Mon’ to census enumerators, they might be accused of false
reporting.20 In this case, it is bureaucratic precedent that would be used as a
litmus test to determine the ‘authentic’ response.
Depending onwhich category is ticked by the census-taker amongst Kachin-
identified populations, the Kachin National Council, for example, sees the
large number of sub-groups as potentially ‘alienating and breaking up eth-
nic national identity’ (Yen Snaing 2014).21 This identity as Kachin partially
comes from Jinghpaw emerging as a lingua franca amongst various tribes,
but then became necessary for political solidarity (Maran 2007:43). The dis-
tinction between clan versus sub-group is blurred, too, as inevitably in such
ethno-nationalist movements there is the push for minorities to surrender
their language and culture for the purpose of national unity (Lee 2009:40). The
more categories, the lesser the likelihood that theminimumpopulation thresh-
old required for ministerial representation will be achieved. There is also the
bureaucratic reality that the greater the number of minority groups, the lesser
the likelihood for political solidarity of non-Burman political organizations
(Gravers 2007:4). This resonates with the resistance to the Statistical Directive
15 in the United States in 1997, whereby census respondents would be allowed
17 The 1973 and 1983 censuses failed to include areas held by insurgent groups as well. Yen
Snaing, ‘No Census for Rebel-Controlled Parts of Kachin State’.
18 Yen Snaing, ‘As census kicks off, questions and criticisms persist’.
19 Yen Snaing, ‘As census kicks off, questions and criticisms persist’.
20 Yen Snaing, ‘As census kicks off, questions and criticisms persist’.
21 Yen Snaing, ‘No Census for Rebel-Controlled Parts of Kachin State’.
20 ferguson
Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 171 (2015) 1–28
to choose multiple categories. African-American and Latino rights leaders saw
themove as a ‘whitewash’ thatwould result in a loss of ethnic andpolicy-related
distinctions for their groups (Bowker and Star 1999:4).
A groupofChin activists petitionedPresidentThein Sein aswell as the immi-
grationminister for a re-drafting of the census, as they noted that the form had
gotten a number of tribal group’s names wrong.22 Whereas the Chin activists,
with their greater proximity to such populations, would be in the position to
assist the state in adjusting nomenclature, the problem fails to acknowledge
the fact that the bureaucratic exercise is in a constant relationship of compro-
mise between the exigencies of the state and the intrinsically un-classifiable
and unbounded nature of ethnic categories and identities. For example, the
Palaung (Ta-ang) of Namhsan in the northern Shan State speak a Mon-Khmer
language, and have long interactedwith other Shan Saophas over the centuries.
TheMyanmar census categories place themasoneof the 33 sub-groupsof Shan,
but some have argued that they should have a separate category (Yen Snaing
2014).23
Specific coding potentially leads to further volatility in the case of excluded
categories of people. It has been argued that the percentage of Muslims in
the general population was purposely underestimated in the 1983 census; the
International Crisis Group (icg) claims that Myanmar is 10%Muslim, though
previous censuses put the figure at 4%. They fear that the collection of data
amongst Muslim groups could potentially fuel additional sectarian violence;
as the population of Muslims in the previous census was quite small, if a
greater number was recorded in a contemporary census it might suggest to
anti-Muslimactivists that Rohingyas are not indigenous, but ratherwere recent
migrants to the Rakhine State.
Do recall, though, that the 2014 census is designed to offer an ‘other’ (num-
ber 914) write-in category for respondents to self-identify should their ethnic
category not appear on the list. Prior to the enumeration, there were reports
of some census-takers in Rakhine State being concerned about this. ‘What do
we do if Bengalis ask us to use the term “Rohingya”? We have to go to each and
every house. We are afraid of being attacked if we don’t fulfil their demands.
There have been problems whenever we are taking information from Bengalis’,
claimed one of the enumerators, a female schoolteacher.24
22 Samantha Michaels and Yen Snaing, ‘Burma urged to drop census questions on ethnicity,
religion’, The Irrawaddy, 13-2-2014. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/burma-urged-drop
-census-questions-ethnicity-religion.html (accessed 10-3-2014).
23 Yen Snaing, ‘Burma’s Ethnic Minorities Decry Census, Jostle for Advantage’.
24 ‘Don’t mention “Rohingya” in national census: Local Rakhine residents’, Eleven Myan-
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A Maungdaw resident claimed that ‘[u]sing that term (Rohingya) seems to
suggest that we accept it as a new ethnic category. It would lead to problems
again. We should take action against those who answer with inaccurate or
non-existent ethnic names.’25 The issue of false reporting harks back to the
lessons learned by the British colonial enumerators in that there is a presumed
single, discrete ethnic identity immutable to an individual, and to suggest
otherwise would be a lie. One city elder from Sittwe, Than Htun, is quoted
as saying, ‘If we accept the use of “Rohingya” in the census, then Myanmar
will become the destination country for all Bengalis migrating around the
world who call themselves “Rohingya”. Bengalis do not want to obey the 1982
Citizenship Law and they want to exploit the census to become citizens of
Myanmar.’26Wheremany residents ofMyanmar see the census as amechanism
for identifying citizens for future allotments of social services, this xenophobia
suggests fear that ‘aliens’ seek to legitimize themselves in the eyes of the state,
and therefore avail themselves of these resources. The volatility and hotly
contested nature of the ‘Rohingya’ issue, though, raises questions as towhether
it would even be within the bounds of strategic essentialism to call oneself
Rohingya in such a politically charged climate.
Shortly after the census-taking commenced on 30March 2014, news of diffi-
culties emerged from two areas in the Rakhine State—Ten Nga Village, Kyauk-
taw Township, and ThaWin Chaung (called Bassara in the Rohingya language,
located just south of Maungdaw)—and enumerators stopped conducting the
census. According to reports, enumerators in these areas were not allowing
respondents to claimRohingya ethnicity, and instead forced themto claimBen-
gali.27 In a last-minute decision, the Myanmar government announced that
it would not allow members of the Muslim minority in Rakhine State to self-
report their ethnicity to enumerators as ‘Rohingya’. Presidential spokesperson
YeHtut is quoted as saying, ‘If we ask a family about their ethnicity and they say




25 ‘Don’t mention “Rohingya” in national census’.
26 ‘Don’t mention “Rohingya” in national census’.
27 ‘Burmese census enumerators violate commitmentwith unfpa inwestern Burma’, Burma
Times, 30-3-2014. (http://burmatimes.net/burmese-census-enumerators-violate
-commitment-with-unfpa-in-western-burma/ (accessed 31-3-2014).
28 Lawi Weng, ‘Govt rejects “Rohingya” census classification, causing problems among Mus-
lim communities’, The Irrawaddy, 31-3-2014. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/govt
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a statement by unfpawhich expressed that the international organizationwas
‘deeply concerned about this departure from international census standards,
human rights principles and agreed procedures’.29 The general secretary of the
Rakhine Nationalities Development Party, Oo Hla Saw, was in support of the
actions of enumerators, saying, ‘[A]ctually there are someMuslims identifying
their ethnicity in the census as “Bengali” and some as “Kaman”. However, oth-
ers are bitter and defiant, and insist on calling themselves “Rohingyas”, a term
that is recognized by neither the Arakan (Rakhine) State government nor the
central government.’30 A fewweeks later, in a report released following the pre-
scribed census finish date, the Immigration and Population Ministry claimed
that over 6,000 families, mainly from the Buthidaung, Maungtaw, and Sittwe
townships ‘accepted themselves as Bengalis’, and therefore were registered on
the census (New Light of Myanmar 25 April 2014).31 The degree of ‘acceptance’
(or coercion) these people experienced is beyond the scope of this article, but
the controversy itself shows that authentic self-reporting, as prescribed by the
United Nations, is hardly a reality in a politically charged climate.
The unfpa published provisional results of the 2014 census in August of
that year, and some were surprised by the population total: 51.4 million peo-
ple32 (unfpa 2014b). Prior to enumeration, the government had estimated that
the population of the country was approximately 60 million. The provisional
census results published in August 2014 included information regarding the
population and household size, broken down according to state/region, dis-
-rejects-rohingya-census-classification-causing-problems-among-muslim-communities
.html (accessed 31-3-2014).
29 unfpa (2014). ‘Statement: unfpa concerned about decision not to allow census respon-
dents to self-identify as Rohingya’, unfpaMyanmar http://countryoffice.unfpa.org/
myanmar/2014/04/01/9376/statement_unfpa_concerned_about_decision_not_to_allow_
census_respondents_to_self_identify_as_rohingya/ (accessed 25-4-2014).
30 Colin Hinshelwood, ‘Census-takers fail to count Rohingyas’, dvb Multimedia Group, 1-4-
2014. http://www.dvb.no/news/census-takers-fail-to-count-rohingyas-burma-myanmar/
39210 (accessed 2-4-2014).
31 In a move that surprised many observers, on 22 September 2014, the government an-
nounced that it gave citizenship to 209 displaced Muslims, which included 40 Rohingyas,
in a camp located in Myebon, which is about 51km outside of Sittwe. See Jared Ferrie,
‘Burma gives citizenship to 209 displaced Muslims, including Rohingya’, The Irrawaddy,
22-9-2014. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/burma-gives-citizenship-209-displaced
-muslims-including-rohingya.html (accessed 22-9-2014).
32 unfpa, ‘Myanmar Releases Population Count From Census’, unfpaMyanmar, 30-8-2014.
http://countryoffice.unfpa.org/myanmar/2014/08/30/10473/unfpa_press_release_
myanmar_releases_population_count_from_census (accessed 10-2-2015).
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trict, and sex. The provisional results did not include data on ethnic group, and
U Myint Kyaing, the secretary of the Central Census Commission, was quoted
as saying that the complete census data would be announced after the elec-
tions the following year.33 In October of 2014, U Myint Kyaing announced that
the public release of the census data in May 2015 would not include data on
ethnicity, religion, or occupation.34
Conclusion
After reviewing these issues with the 2014 census, along with the ways in which
the operationhas attracted controversy andhow theMyanmar government has
(or has not) responded to the controversies, it now probably seems ironic that
numbers, with their supposedly objective, rational basis promised a ‘depoliti-
cization’ of politics (Rose 1991:674); by their very nature, indicators project
an aura of objective, rational truth, and facilitate broad comparisons (Merry
2011:s84). It is these ‘purely technical’ ideologies that function to mask the
politically and socially charged agendas behind such bureaucratic exercises,
and their repetition serves to further institutionalize, and thus conceal, those
charged agendas (Bowker and Star 1999:139). Mimiko (2006) argues that it is
the politicized and contested state structure and its poor handling of issues
of ethnicity that have made the census in Nigeria problematic; if the gover-
nance were decentralized with genuine federalism, the census would become
depoliticized (Mimiko 2006:1). Ethnic nationalities in Myanmar have designed
their own censuses to verify the data of the official, national one.35 But would
international aid organizations accept these alternative censuses?
In light of the history of the census in Myanmar, genuine federalism is a
project, and one which political leaders, themselves empowered along ethnic
lines, have often advocated. The level of politicization surrounding the data-
gathering project is certainly in stark contrast to that of public ‘indifference’
as noted by the 1931 census (Bennison 1933:viii). In the case of Myanmar, both
unfpa and the government are continually assuring the public that the census
exercise is ‘purely statistical’, despite sceptics such as Saw Kyaw Swar, secretary




34 Soe, ‘Religion joins ethnicity on list of Myanmar census results to be delayed’.
35 Ghosh, ‘Myanmar census risks stirring ethnic tensions’.
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of the Karen Affairs Committee, thinking the results will be used for politi-
cal purposes.36 Those political purposes (and political outcomes) have already
been foreshadowed by the kinds of controversy the operation itself has ignited.
Leaders of ethnically based parties and ceasefire groups are vocal in their
resistance to the 2014 census’s use of ethnic categories, but often insist that
the categories be used differently, or that there are more accurate categories
which should be used, rather than abandon the use of ethnic categories alto-
gether. Because the results of this 2014 census will surely be taken seriously, it
is important to consider them in light of the history of the census-taking exer-
cises in both colonial and independent Burma, as well as the pragmatic histo-
ries behind those exercises.Whereas the routinizedmethods of data-collecting
regarding ethnicity in many contexts are more likely to follow precedence
rather than create new categories, the existence of numerous separationist
armed groups creating fissures surrounding these categories throws their valid-
ity into question in other ways. This proves two major points: that studying
the history of the census in a country such as Myanmar offers an important
repository for understanding the ways in which the state understands human
diversity and seeks to manage it; and secondly, although the empirical oper-
ation is relied upon to divest the aura of a ‘political agenda’ from the state
through seemingly apolitical numbers, the very process of counting (and being
counted)—or not—is highly political indeed.
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